Community preselections for Sydney Lord Mayor are an improvement but it’s no panacea

The announcement this morning that NSW Labor will adopt a “community preselection” to determine its candidate for Sydney Lord Mayor should not come as a complete surprise. The use of community preselections in local government elections was outlined by NSW General Secretary Sam Dastyari in an op-ed last year prior to the 2011 NSW Labor Conference.

The NSW Conference endorsed trialling community preselections in some local council elections and for five state electorates with the caveat that non-members would have no more than a 50 per cent say in candidate selection. Following Conference, there were murmurings of a trial for the Sydney Lord Mayor contest. Rumour has it that NSW Labor may even trial community preselections for other directly elected mayoral contests this September.

The community preselection model to be trialled is slightly different to the model proposed in the Faulkner/Carr/Bracks review which supported a stronger weighting for members and a component for members of affiliated unions. Instead it will take the shape of an electoral college that is half open primary, half rank-and-file preselection.

Former Labor candidate for Lord Mayor of Sydney, Meredith Burgmann outlined two main reasons for it in her conveniently timed opinion piece advocating for community preselections, reconnecting with residents and breaking perceptions about NSW Labor.

A community preselection is undoubtedly better than the previous process where NSW Labor Conference determined the candidate. It led to a debacle where Tony Pooley was pre-selected as the Sydney Lord Mayor candidate by NSW Labor Conference but withdrew at a later date and was replaced by Meredith Burgmann whom he defeated.

The history of community preselections

This move towards community involvement in preselections by political parties in Australia is relatively new phenomenon. Experimentation can be traced back to 2010 when the NSW Nationals and Victorian Labor trialled open primaries. The Nationals trialled it for the seat of Tamworth and had over 4,000 participants, subsequently winning the seat back from independent MP Peter Draper in 2011. Labor conducted its primary in the seat of Kilsyth, however, it met with little success.

Recent discussion within Labor has focused on community preselections instead of open primaries, involving a “supporters” component but keeping members involved in preselections. This can be traced back to the 2010 National Review which recommended the trial of a “community preselection” involving 20 per cent community members, 20 per cent members of affiliated unions and 60 per cent branch members.

A strong push for trialling community preselections has come from within the more reform minded state Labor branches of New South Wales and Tasmania, ironically controlled by the Right and Left respectively. In Tasmania, Labor is likely to trial a community preselection for the federal seat of Denison against Andrew Wilkie after a failed attempt to hold one for the Tasmanian Legislative Council seat of Hobart.

What about a rank-and-file ballot?

While it is a definite improvement on NSW Labor Conference determining the Lord Mayor candidate, the question of “Why wasn’t a rank-and-file ballot attempted?” has been skipped over and not addressed at all.

Rather than jumping straight into a “community preselection”, it might be a good opportunity to try something different, for example, allowing anyone who joins NSW Labor in the City of Sydney, a vote on who is the Lord Mayor candidate.

Under the current proposal, the restricting of eligibility to those who have been members for twelve months (as well as the required number of meetings) cuts off for any incentive for people to join to have their say in determining who is the Lord Mayoral candidate.

The debate about community preselections versus rank-and-file preselections is a proxy for a much larger issue that Labor will need to address in the near future. It goes to question of ‘what is the value of party membership?’.

By jumping straight to community preselection without seriously lowering barriers to party membership and eligibility to participate in rank-and-file preselections, it create a risk of hollowing out the value of remaining a member. These remaining members do the bulk of the work maintaining the existing party structure. If in the process of reaching out, the value of membership is hollowed out, it will have dire consequences for organising and building outside of Labor-held electorates in the future.

Will the “community preselection” succeed?

While many are pinning their hopes on the success of community selection to renew the party, effort must be invested in being able to measure whether the “community preselection” has succeeded. As the Griffin Review of the 2010 Victorian election stated:

when primary pre‐selection systems are further trialled, it is essential that they are properly evaluated so that they can be accurately assessed

There needs to some clear parameters set right now to evaluate the success of a community preselection. It is unlikely to be possible to completely measure success until after the election in September 2012, however, everyone needs to be clear about the aims of community preselection. It goes to the very purpose of why it has been adopted.

At the moment, it is unclear if its purpose is to use supporters as a sounding board for new ideas and candidates, a way of acknowledging that supporters have a different relationship to the party than members or whether it’s about identifying and recruiting potential members or a mix of all three. This needs to be clarified.

My guess is that the broad aims of community preselection are to detoxify Labor to increase its vote, use it as a voter ID activity and hopefully recruit some of those supporters to help campaign against Clover Moore.

There is a risk that NSW Labor is putting all its egg in one basket by focusing on community preselections. If Labor spends considerable resources on it but it does not do considerably better electorally and those participants do not campaign or become members, what will NSW Labor do? It is a particularly relevant concern as the Griffin Review highlighted that significant resources went into the Kilsyth open primary and:

it did not translate into increased party membership or improved electoral performance.

Opening up isn’t enough, a Labor vision and policies are necessary

While it is a positive step to re-engage with supporters and shows a willingness to change, community preselections and party reform more broadly are not enough on its own to rebuild NSW Labor in the inner city or across the Australia.

In 2009, David Miliband spoke about the need to open up the British Labour Party and used the example of a European sister party that embraced open primaries to elect its leader, had deliberative and engaging party structures and how Labour could learn from this. The party he was referring to was PASOK, the Greek Socialist Party, which has crumbled over the past year and is nearing electoral oblivion. For all the openness and reform it embraced, it did not help PASOK when it adopted deeply unpopular policies and turned its back on its base.

Turning supporters into the advocates and activists that a party needs to rebuild requires vision and good policies. Labor needs to engage with the inner city’s diverse demographics with an alternative vision that inspires and connects. This applies to Leichhardt and Marrickville Local Government Areas as much as the City of Sydney.

Current Sydney Lord Mayor Clover Moore has a vision that is well known. It encompasses urban villages, push for light rail, Copenhagen-style bike paths and small bars but what about Labor? What is Labor’s distinct vision for the City of Sydney that will resonate with its base and other potential votes?

I doubt most people, even rank-and-file Labor members, could answer that. One can only hope that this community preselection will provide a platform for candidates to articulate and shape a Labor vision and platform for the City of Sydney.

Given that Labor barely beat the Liberals and Greens in 2008, unless Labor can clearly articulate an alternative vision, a community preselection on its own will not rebuild the party in the inner city, let alone come anywhere near beating Clover Moore.

UPDATE 1/3/12: A copy of rules motions from the 2011 NSW Conference are available via OurALP. Item 156 covers the trial of community preselections.

UPDATE #2 1/3/12: I am starting to wonder whether there is enough time to hold a proper community preselection process. According to the new N.43 rule adopted:

e) Voting in a community selection ballot must close at least three months before Election Day for the election for which a candidate is being selected.

Local council elections will occur on 8 September, meaning that community preselections will need to occur by early June. It leaves three months maximum for potential candidates to declare and run. This process should have commenced a year ago.

How should Labor elect its leader?

With a ballot for the leadership of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) happening tomorrow morning, it’s timely to examine how its leader is currently elected and whether change is desirable.

How is the leader currently chosen?

The power to choose the leader is held by the parliamentary party. A leadership ballot can be called by the parliamentary leader or a third of Caucus members signing a petition. Other than a brief period under Jack Lang, when the power to determine the NSW parliamentary leader was given to Conferencei, the parliamentary wing has always held the power to choose the leader at state and federal levels.

Historically, the largest faction (usually the Right) has held the leadership of the party with the smaller faction receiving the deputy leadership (usually the Left). However, in recent years this has changed as shown by MPs from the Left faction holding the state party leadership in Queensland, South Australia and Victoria where they do not constitute a majority.

Caucus selection is not actually the norm in Westminster systems

While Australia has a parliamentary system, all parties have run increasingly presidential-style campaigns. The parliamentary leader is usually at the centre of the election campaign and often personifies the party to the public. A party’s electoral success or failure is often linked to the success of its leader.

Yet despite the parliamentary leader being increasingly central to a party’s electoral fortunes and direction, rank-and-file members have no say at all in who that person is. What is rarely discussed is that this is an anomaly across English speaking countries with a Westminster system. All parties in Canada and the United Kingdom, and most in Ireland, allow rank-and-file members to have input into the leader election process. A recent paper by William Cross and Andre Blais highlighted that only major parties in New Zealand and all parties in Australia are hold outs on direct participation.

A mood for change?

One of the few positives about the current soap opera in the Federal Labor Caucus is that it may encourage greater discussion and debate over the direct election of party leader to avoid a repeat of the current situation. The fact that NSW ALP General Secretary (and NSW Right faction convenor) Sam Dastyari has made recent comments about a ‘revolving door’ and indicated lukewarm support for the idea of rank-and-file participation in leadership selections says a lot.

While the Australian Democrats are invoked as a reason not to go down the path of direct elections, the success of direct elections in Canada, the United Kingdom and France and growing concern about declining membership mean that a move towards some form of direct election is possible as Labor seeks to address shrinking membership base and rebuild from Opposition in a number of states.

Cross and Blais identified that where major parties have moved to a degree of direct election, it tends to be after a poor electoral result. Authority shifts away from the parliamentary party and the pent up demand for change that is contained while in Government is released. The importance and urgency of rebuilding after a loss means that parties want to seem more responsive to their rank-and-file who will be needed and want to show the broader electorate that they are changing.

The catalyst for change in Labor will be electoral self-interest, firstly to show stability in the party leadership to regain public confidence and secondly, to grow party membership. The adoption is likely to start at a state level where a heavy defeat has occurred and there is a strong push to reform to re-engage members and supporters such as in New South Wales.

Stable leadership

Undoubtedly there is an increasing need to have more stable tenure for leaders and to show that the leadership is not a revolving door, particularly in New South Wales. Since 2001, there have been five leaders of the FPLP and since 2008, there have been four leaders of the NSW PLP. A direct election would strengthen the mandate for the leader and give confidence to the electorate that a party leader will not be suddenly replaced.

Leadership changes would be minimised unless absolutely necessary. Creating momentum through underhanded tactics to replace the party leader would be far harder with an expanded pool of electors. The cost and time to conduct a leadership election would also be a deterrent to happening regularly and immediately.

The campaigning abilities of potential leaders could also be tested before they are elected. Public reaction to potential leaders over a period of time could be gauged before they are elected leader. This would address one of the key reasons why leaders are replaced under the current system.

Building an army of campaigners

The successful sandbagging of Maroubra, Marrickville and the close contest in Balmain at the 2011 NSW election shows that election campaigns can be won by on-the-ground campaigning. The future will be a greater reliance on members and supporters for campaigning and resources as a result of the moves towards capping expenditures and donations. Members will only join if you can give them a good reason to and stay and participate if they have a sense of ownership. A say in the leadership for every member will do this.

There will be resistance to implement the structural change necessary to give members a say, however, the banning of trade union affiliation fees (which has happened in NSW and is likely to occur elsewhere) is likely to be the factor that forces this to occur.

How would direct elections operate?

It is unclear what model of direct election would operate in practice and would be up for considerable debate. Amongst potential models, immigration Minister Chris Bowen has flagged a half Caucus/half rank-and-file. while Alex White has previously outlined a potential model based on the British Labour Party. Sam Dastyari is also on the record as a fan of the Conservative Party model where the parliamentary party shortlists two candidates.

The experience of the Australian Democrats is likely to rule out a pure One Member One Vote system and maintain some level of parliamentary party input in any immediate change, however this would still be an improvement on the current system.

While the logistics and cost of a direct election may be raised, the conduct of the National President and the NSW Labor Policy Forum ballots are two examples that show direct elections can work in the Labor Party. Potentially the cost of holding the election could be recovered if individuals were given the immediate right to vote when they join during the leadership election period similar to the small fee paid to participate in the Socialist Party presidential primary.

The future

The only positive that may come from this Rudd/Gillard power struggle is an impetus for rank-and-file participation in leader selection to strengthen their mandate and curb the ability of members in the Caucus to destabilise.

However, this is unlikely to occur until a loss of Government occurs and after Coalition Governments ban affiliation fees. Even then, it is likely to be adopted state-by-state first and only after a protracted push and realisation that it is necessary to rebuild party membership.

Even so, the coming debate about directly electing the party leader under the umbrella of Labor Party reform would be an important step for democratising all political parties in Australia.

UPDATE 27/02/12: A good summary of the procedures of this morning’s Caucus meeting.

UPDATE 21/03/13: At their Congress last year, New Zealand Labour adopted a 40/40/20 electoral college model for electing their party leader.

It’s time to re-examine universalism in public policy

Since the heyday of universalism under the Whitlam Government, Commonwealth Governments on the both left and right have pursued means-testing as a standard policy. Most recently, it has been the current Labor Government vigorously pursuing means-testing on a range of existing Government programs.

The progressive case for means-testing argues that targeting is better use of finite resources and it ensures that those who can afford services and benefits are not subsidised by those on lower-incomes. But is means-testing automatically more progressive than a universal program? A recent report from the British Fabian Society casts doubt on it.

Using international data, the report shows a paradox of redistribution. Where benefits are more targeted, the likelihood of addressing poverty and inequality decreases. Targeting leads to a fall in overall generosity, leaving poor families worse off than when benefits are widely available. Interestingly, the OECD made a similar point in December last year, stating that:

The main reason for less effective redistribution over the past 15 years was on the benefit side: levels were cut and eligibility rules tightened to contain expenditures for social protection

The reality is far more complex. Targeted measures may be more progressive that universal approaches but this is based on the assumption of the same amount of spending. Expenditure tends to decrease as welfare states become more targeted, meaning less is redistributed to those from a lower socioeconomic background. The report concludes:

Any increase in redistribution from an increase in targeting is clearly outweighed by the smaller expenditure that is associated with the lower willingness to pay of targeted welfare states

It becomes clear that the debate on universal versus targeted programs should not be one about which is more progressive. It is fundamentally about how much we are willing to pay for improved outcomes. For social democrats, the focus should be on how to ensure the fiscal sustainability of universal programs, particularly managing the effects of an ageing population and a shrinking tax base.

Traditionally social democrats have looked for new sources of Government revenue or ensured universal access to schemes but funded it through progressive taxation and levies. However, a greater focus should be placed on designing universal programs that both improve outcomes but long-term will increase taxation revenue and/or decrease cost burdens on government.

Introducing universal early childhood education is a good example of the latter. A 2011 publication on universal childcare by British thinktank IPPR cited recent evidence from Quebec. The introduction of heavily subsidised universal childcare in 1997 increased labour force participation amongst mothers with dependent children, generating $1.05 for each $1 spent and reducing government support in the form of benefits. Universal early childhood education is just one example of universalism that is both fiscally sustainable and will improve social outcomes. These types of universal programs, fiscally sustainable and providing a service that most people will use, could become a centrepiece of a modern social democratic agenda.

Nearly forty years after the election of Whitlam Government, it’s time for Australian social democrats to have a serious debate about the limitations of means-testing and re-examine the principle of universalism in public policy.